1085月號 道 法 法 訊 (325)

DEEP & FAR

 

 

美國案例研析(七之四)

 

蔡馭理 專利師

•臺灣大學電機學士

•臺灣大學電信工程研究所碩士

•美國新罕布什大學法律學院智權法碩士

•交通大學科技法律研究所

•美國專利代理人考試及格

•大陸專利代理人

 

案例七之四:Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131 (June 20, 2016)

 

1.         Patent: 多方複審程序Inter Partes Review

1.2    案例解析:Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131 (June 20, 2016)

1.2.4爭點及其法院見解(Issues & Holdings)

(1) 根據35 U.S.C. §314(d)規定,IPR複審當事人可否就PTAB是否進行複審之決定(institution decision),向美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院(CAFC)提出上訴? No. 35 U.S.C. §314(d)規定禁止CuozzoPTAB是否進行複審之決定(institution decision),向美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院(CAFC)提出上訴1

(2) 根據35 U.S.C. §316(a)(4)規定及37 C.F.R. §42.100(b)USPTO頒布規則,PTAB在美國發明法案(AIA)之多方複審程序(IPR)中採用最寬廣合理解釋原則(broadest reasonable interpretation standardBRI)來解釋專利請求項文字用語,是否逾越其法定權限?No. BRI是立法機關明確授權給USPTO自己制定的權力。2

 

1.2.5理由(Rationale)

(1) §314(d)明確規定“shall be final and nonappealable”,若仍可上訴進行司法複審,將違背國會授權PTAB決定是否複審的重要權力的立法目的。3

法院認為支持司法複審的基本假設,會因為國會明確的授權而被推翻。4法院並提出了下述最高法院的案例進行論證。法院提到國會通常不會企圖禁止法院對於聯邦行政機關的司法複審的基本假設。(Congress rarely intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives to federal agencies. For that reason, this Court applies a “strong presumption” favoring judicial review of administrative action. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 90 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986). )但當國會明確希望行政機關能自治時,此基本假設可被推翻。(That presumption is rebuttable: It fails when a statute’s language or structure demonstrates that Congress wanted an agency to police its own conduct. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015).),何況假設就只是假設,當立法明確時,此假設即可被克服。(The presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that -- a presumption. This presumption, like all presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 341, 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2451 (1984).)

 

1Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).

2Id.

3Id. at 2134. (The text of §314(d) expressly states that the Patent Office's determinations whether to institute inter partes review “shall be final and nonappealable.” Moreover, construing §314(d) to permit judicial review of the Patent Office's preliminary decision to institute inter partes review undercuts the important congressional objective of giving the agency significant power to revisit and revise earlier patent grants.)

4Id. (The “strong presumption” favoring judicial review, is overcome here by these “ 'clear and convincing' ” indications that Congress intended to bar review.)